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INTRODUCTION
“To say that customs have the force of laws in a country, where
all the laws are written appears to us a contradiction.”1
Who pays for the wedding reception—the bride’s parents or the
newlyweds? Can a woman use her husband’s surname after a divorce?
These might seem like etiquette questions for Miss Manners,2 but
Louisiana courts have answered these questions by referring to custom,3 a
primary source of law in Louisiana.4 These cases are rare, however;
Louisiana courts usually reject a litigant’s attempt to invoke custom. 5
When the courts do mention custom, they often mean conventional usage,
a secondary source of Louisiana law.6
Copyright 2019, by GAIL S. STEPHENSON.
* Louisiana Outside Counsel A.A. Lenoir Endowed Professor and Director
of Legal Analysis & Writing at Southern University Law Center; J.D., Louisiana
State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center 1984. Funding to support work on
this Article was provided by a summer research stipend from Southern University
Law Center, with special thanks to Chancellor John K. Pierre. I also thank SULC
Director of Library Services Phebe Poydras and her amazing staff for their
research assistance, as well as the participants at the Louisiana Scholarly
Workshop 2018 at Loyola New Orleans for their helpful suggestions.
1. 1 LA. STATE LAW INST., LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES: A REPUBLICATION
OF THE PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825 (1937) (proposing
suppression of article 3).
2. Judith Martin writes a newspaper column on etiquette under the name
“Miss Manners”; she also writes books on etiquette. See, e.g., JUDITH MARTIN,
MISS MANNERS ON WEDDINGS (1999).
3. See Int’l River Ctr. v. Kogos, 516 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(bride testified it was “common custom for the parents of the bride to pay for the
wedding reception”); Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. Ct. App.
1977) (divorced women are customarily “known by a combination of their
Christian name, their family surname and their former husband's surname”).
4. Article 1 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: “The sources of law are
legislation and custom.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2019). The 1987 Revision
Comments to article 1 state that “[a]ccording to civilian doctrine, legislation and
custom are authoritative or primary sources of law.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1
cmt. b (2019).
5. See, e.g., Perry v. Allied Offshore Marine Corp., 618 So. 2d 1033, 1036
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the alleged custom—a court’s long-standing
practice of hearing maintenance and cure cases by summary process—as it
violated Louisiana procedural law).
6. See, e.g., Terrell v. Alexandria Auto Co., 125 So. 757, 759 (La. Ct. App.
1930) (in interpreting a contract of sale, the court referred to the business practice

2019]

CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN LOUISIANA

1047

Some commentators consider jurisprudence constante—“an
interpretation of a rule of law that has been accepted and applied by the
courts in repeated decisions in a long line of cases”7—to be custom and
thus binding law, but most Louisiana courts have stated that jurisprudence,
even jurisprudence constante, is instead a secondary source of law with
only persuasive effect.8
This Article explores the historical basis of consuetudinary law and
the definition of custom, including its characteristics, its distinction from
usage, and its relation to jurisprudence. This Article examines the
Louisiana Civil Code’s treatment of custom and the legislative history of
the 1987 revisions to the Louisiana Civil Code to determine what the
Louisiana Legislature intended when it established custom as a primary
source of law. The Article also surveys the Louisiana courts’ treatment of
custom, including the courts’ confusion between custom and conventional
usage and the requirements courts imposed to prove custom. Finally, the
Article looks at the decline of custom as a primary source of law and
attempts to determine whether customary law still exists in Louisiana.
I. HISTORICAL TRADITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Custom was the law of preliterate societies,9 “preserved in the memory
of old men.”10 Custom has been described as an “ancient, but now very
often foreign, source of law.”11 In the sixth century, custom was
recognized in Emperor Justinian’s Digest.12 The Digest, or Pandect, was
a compilation of classical legal texts from the first century B.C. to the
fourth century A.D.;13 the Digest stated, “Custom of long standing is
rightly regarded as law.”14

of delivering a car by driving it from the dealership to the purchaser’s home as
“the custom of the place”).
7. MARY GARVEY ALGERO, LOUISIANA LEGAL RESEARCH 8–9 (3d ed. 2017).
8. See, e.g., Delta Chem. Corp. v. Lynch, 979 So. 2d 579, 588 (La. Ct. App.
2008).
9. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 3 (2010).
10. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 2 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 251 (J.V. Prichard
ed., Thomas Nugent trans., London, 1914).
11. Emily Kadens, Introduction: Lessons from the History of Custom, 48
TEX. INT’L L.J. 349, 355 (2013).
12. R.H. Helmkolz, Christopher St. German and the Law of Custom, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2003).
13. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM COURSE
OUTLINES, Part 1, § 9, at 18 (1971).
14. Helmkolz, supra note 12.
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Most early Roman and European law in the Middle Ages was
customary.15 The customs—coutumes—were ultimately written down or,
in some cases, enacted as legislation.16 In France in 1453, King Charles
VII in the Ordinance of Montil-les-Tours called for French customs to be
reduced to writing.17 This began to be accomplished once printed books
became widely available in the late 15th century.18 The Coutume de
Ponthieu, the “first definitive text of a coutume,” was published in 1495.19
By the 16th century, most customary law in France was reduced to
writing.20 Codifications of the 19th century diminished the role of
unwritten custom in France as a subsidiary source of law.21
The enacted custom “resist[ed] in many fields the invasion of Roman
law,”22 but Roman law was used to fill gaps in the customary law in civil
law countries.23 When Roman law and custom conflicted, however,
custom prevailed.24 This “pan-European amalgam of inherited Roman
law, the emerging canon law of the [Roman Catholic] Church, and preexisting customary regimes”—the ius commune—is “the cultural bridge
of the Western legal tradition.”25
Both civil and common law systems recognize customary law and
acknowledge it as the source of modern law. John Selden, a 17th century
English jurist and legal historian, noted “that all law originates, historically,
in customary law.”26 One commentator noted that a “surprising degree of
15. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89.
16. Id.
17. THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
CIVIL LAW 122 (1999).
18. Id.
19. JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF THE PROVINCE OF
QUÉBEC 37 (1962).
20. RENÉ DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW 6 (1980).
21. Claire M. Germain, The French Legal System: Sources of Law,
Authorities and Research Methods, in INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL
SYSTEMS 57, 61 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H. Bernal eds., 1994).
22. Id.
23. Id.; F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 18
(1955).
24. LAWSON, supra note 23, at 40.
25. BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 22.
26. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden,
Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1700 (1994); see also BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“All
law begins with custom . . . .”). Not all commentators gave customary law the same
respect, however. Jeremy Bentham, English philosopher and jurist, referred to
customary law as “traditionary law” but “dismissed it. . . . as the law for ‘barbarians.’”
Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 523, 525 (2013)
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commonality” exists in the treatment of customary law in the legal systems
that developed in Europe.27 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England
in 1765, William Blackstone noted that Roman law paid great regard to
custom, but not as much as the common law; under Roman law, custom
was adopted only when the written law was deficient.28
II. DEFINITION OF CUSTOM
Commentators and judges have struggled “to find a cogent and
functional definition of custom”29 “since at least the twelfth century.”30 One
writer noted that custom has “many different and concurrent meanings.”31
Most codes do not define custom because definitions of sources of law are
considered “a matter of legal science rather than legislation.”32
An English law professor, Bernard S. Jackson, defined custom as “the
unwritten body of norms of a group.”33 Another English writer defined it
as “the unwritten law . . . of Romanistic origin which often serves the
purpose of supplying any gaps there may be in the provisions of the
codes.”34 French law professor François Gény described custom as “a
complex of facts” that “reveal a legal sentiment.”35 A frequent description

(quoting THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAN: OF THE LIMITS OF THE
PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE 162 (Philip Schofield ed., 2010)).
27. See BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 22.
28. See id. at 31 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 73–74 (1765–69)).
29. Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary Is Customary
International Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 906 (2013).
30. Kadens, supra note 11, at 349.
31. H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 80 (1946).
32. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine as Sources of Law in
Louisiana and in France, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN
CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 69, 70 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974); see
also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 90; Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance
of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 38, 45 (Joseph Dainow
ed., 1974).
33. Bernard S. Jackson, Code and Custom, in CODES AND CUSTOMS:
MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVES 119, 119 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1994). Jackson
further described custom as “the internalisation of norms.” Id. at 120.
34. GUTTERIDGE, supra note 31.
35. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVÉ POSITIF § 110 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed. 1954).
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of custom is “bottoms-up lawmaking”—law made “without the command
of a single sovereign.”36
Marcel Planiol defined custom as “law which has not been sanctioned
by legislation. It consists of traditional rules established little by little in
the course of time, and which are often difficult to ascertain.”37 Unlike
most codes, the Louisiana Civil Code has always defined custom. From
Louisiana’s first Civil Code in 1808 until its 1987 revision, article 3 read:
“Customs result from a long series of actions constantly repeated, which
have by such repetition, and by uninterrupted acquiescence, acquired the
force of a tacit and common consent.”38 The current version of the Code
states that “[c]ustom results from practice repeated for a long time and
generally accepted as having acquired the force of law.”39
A. Characteristics of Custom
Custom’s key characteristics are “longevity, consistency, and
widespread observance.”40 Professor Emily Kadens condenses these
characteristics into two parts: “an objective requirement that an act be done
repeatedly over time [the longevity and consistency factors], and a
subjective requirement [known as the opinio juris] that the people
engaging in the act do so out of a sense of legal obligation [the widespread
observance factor].”41 The comments to Civil Code article 3 are in accord:
“According to civilian theory, the two elements of custom are a long
practice (longa consuetudo) and the conviction that the practice has the
force of law (opinio necessitatis or opinio juris).”42
36. Kadens & Young, supra note 29, at 886–87; see also BEDERMAN, supra
note 9, at x; Pascale Fournier & Pascal McDougall, False Jurisdictions? A
Revisionist Take on Customary (Religious) Law in Germany, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J.
435, 436 (2013).
37. MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, Vol. 1, part 1,
§ 3(11) 8–9 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959).
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 (1885) (revised 1987).
39. Id. art. 3 (2019).
40. BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 19.
41. Kadens, supra note 11, at 350. The common law concept of custom also
requires a sense of legal obligation. As one commentator explained, “[T]he
custom must, even prior to its formal recognition by the courts, have created in
some people an obligation to conform.” Schauer, supra note 26, at 524.
Furthermore, the “notion of custom arising out of a sense of legal
obligation . . . has been specifically recognized as an attribute of customary
international law.” David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom:
Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1451 (1996).
42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3 cmt. b (2019).
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Both the objective and subjective parts are necessary. Repeated
behavior that the community does not consider legally binding is merely
conventional usage.43 For example, standing for the national anthem and
writing thank you notes are societal expectations.44 Failure to do these acts
may earn social disapprobation,45 but no legal consequences result from
their nonobservance.46 As Gény explained, the requirement of “color of
necessity (opinio necessitatis)” “excludes from its scope certain social
practices which may be firmly established, but which would claim in vain
the character of a source of positive private law, for the usage on which
they are based does not imply any coercive idea.”47
Planiol stated that “there are controversies without end” regarding
customary law’s authority and nature.48 Planiol himself believed custom
could become an obligatory authority only after it had been “applied in
adjudged cases”49 but acknowledged that “the majority of modern authors
deny that customary law originates with the courts.”50
French jurists are of three schools regarding what constitutes custom.51
The first says that custom includes “practice, usages, received doctrine,
and even the circumstances of social life.”52 The second “assimilates
custom to usages of daily life, social, business, industrial, and agricultural,
and even the rules of etiquette and moral and religious practices.”53 The
third limits custom to case law.54 French law professor and Dean Yvon
Loussouarn was of the opinion that the first was too broad, the second
43. Kadens, supra note 11, at 350.
44. Schauer, supra note 26, at 530.
45. See, e.g., Alex Altman & Sean Gregory, Trump’s Offensive Playbook,
TIME, Oct. 9, 2017, at 33 (United States President Donald Trump referred to a
National Football League player who knelt rather than stood for the national
anthem as a “son of a bitch”).
46. For example, standing for the national anthem is not required by statute.
See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1)(C) (2012) (during the national anthem, persons
“should face the flag and stand at attention” (emphasis added)). No penalty
attaches for failing to stand.
47. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 110.
48. PLANIOL, supra note 37, part 1, § 3 (No. 11) p. 9.
49. Id.
50. Id. at n.6. Planiol denied the idea that a judge was bound to follow
customary law, stating, “That is an English idea that has never been accepted in
France.” Id. § 3 (No. 14) p. 12, n.10.
51. Yvon Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom,
Doctrine, and Precedent in French Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 235, 247 (1958).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 247–48.
54. Id. at 248.
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included usages that were not juridically binding and thus did not have the
force of law, and the third was incorrect because judicial decisions are not
binding in France.55
B. Usage Distinguished from Custom
Louisiana legislators apparently agreed with Loussouarn that none of
the three French schools of thought were correct. The first two include
usages, “a much broader, less-demanding concept than custom,”56 although
even statutory texts often “improperly classif[y]” usages as custom.57
Planiol stated that the nature of usages was “quite different from that of
Custom.”58 He explained that when usages were adopted in contracts, they
were “freely adopted,” as opposed to customs, which were “imposed upon
them.”59 He further noted that “usages followed by individuals are
absolutely without force” and that a “usage is merely a fact.”60
Gény explained that usages include “all the manifestations of society
which remain outside the positive legal order”—“the habits of daily life, . . .
the mores of the people or of certain social classes, the commercial and other
economic usages, the rules of civil behavior, the social conventions, or even
moral and religious practices.”61 The lack of a coercive ideation, however,
prevents them from becoming positive law.62
The Louisiana Civil Code distinguishes custom from usage and
specifically refers to usage in articles on interpretation of contracts,63
explaining that a usage is “a practice regularly observed.”64 Article 4
provides that the courts may resort to “justice, reason, and prevailing
usages” in the absence of custom or legislation.65
55. Id.
56. David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of Industry Custom and Usage in Oil
& Gas Litigation, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (2004).
57. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 110.
58. PLANIOL, supra note 37, part 1, § 3 (No. 14) p. 11 n.8.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 3 (No. 11) p. 10 n.6.
61. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 110 (footnote omitted).
62. Id.
63. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1785, 2053–55 (2019).
64. Id. art. 2055.
65. Id. art. 4. This is similar to article 7 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico,
which provides: “When there is no statute applicable to the case at issue, the court
shall decide in accordance with equity, which means that natural justice, as
embodied in the general principles of jurisprudence and in accepted and
established usages and customs, shall be taken into consideration.” P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, § 7 (2018).
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The comments to article 1 explain that legislation and custom, the
primary sources of law, “are contrasted with persuasive or secondary
sources of law, such as . . . conventional usages . . . that may guide the
court in reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom.”66
C. Jurisprudence Is Not Custom
Louisiana legislators and judges have rejected the third school of
thought—that judicial decisions are customary law. The comments to
article 1 of the Civil Code explicitly state that jurisprudence is “persuasive
or secondary” and that courts should use it only in the absence of
legislation and custom.67 Louisiana courts have repeated this principle
innumerable times,68 most recently in Justice John L. Weimer’s
concurrence in Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority, in
which the court stated, “[J]urisprudence, even when it arises to the level
of jurisprudence constante, is a secondary source of law.”69
Some doctrinal writers, mostly those writing before the 1987
amendment to the Civil Code, have opined that “a long line of decisions
on a certain subject may be taken to establish rules of customary law” that
courts must follow.70 In 1973, Professor William Thomas Tête asserted

66. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (2019).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000);
Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (La. 1978) (“The
case law is invaluable as previous interpretation of [a statute] . . . , but it is
nevertheless secondary information.”); Royal v. Cook, 984 So. 2d 156, 163 (La.
Ct. App. 2008).
69. Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 218 So. 3d 513, 529 (La.
2016) (Weimer, J., concurring) (quoting Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian
Venturer in Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1369, 1372 (1988)).
70. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 35, at 101; see also Mack E. Barham,
Methodology of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 50 TUL. L. REV. 474, 484 (1976)
(“[T]here also exists that jurisprudence which, through common usage, has
become accepted as a source of law as custom.”); Robert A. Pascal & W. Thomas
Tête, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term: Law
in General, 31 LA. L. REV. 185, 186 (1971) (“‘[A] long series’ of judicial
decisions, ‘constantly repeated’ and enjoying ‘uninterrupted acquiescence’ by the
people may evidence that ‘tacit and common consent’ of the people which is as
generative of custom as the express consent of the whole people through their
representatives is generative of legislation.”); Robert L. Henry, Jurisprudence
Constante and Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 A.B.A. J. 11 (1929) (“The Civil Law
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that article 3 of the 1825 Civil Code was based on Spanish law, not French,
and that the Spanish concept of custom “closely linked customary law and
judicial decision.”71 Thus, he concluded that the courts’ repeated
enforcement of a rule could create customary law.72
Other commentators, however, agree with Justice Weimer’s assertions
that jurisprudence constante does not create customary, binding law. For
example, former Louisiana Supreme Court justice and current federal
appellate judge James L. Dennis wrote, “Jurisprudence constante
certainly does not represent legislative force in the proper sense, such as
we attach to written law or custom.”73
III. CIVIL CODE TREATMENT OF CUSTOM
From the first version of the Louisiana Civil Code in 1808 until its
1987 revision, article 1 read: “Law is a solemn expression of legislative
will.”74 According to Professor Vernon Palmer, this article was seen as “a
manifesto proclaiming that legislation is the only recognized source of law
and, in relation to it, jurisprudence would have no or low value.”75 Article
3 previously read: “Customs result from a long series of actions constantly
repeated, which have by such repetition and by uninterrupted acquiescence
acquired the force of a tacit and common consent.”76

begins with the principle that precedents are not binding. Then it makes
exceptions where the matter is jurisprudence constante.”).
71. William Thomas Tête, The Code, Custom, and the Courts: Notes Toward
a Louisiana Theory of Precedent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
72. Id. at 1–2, 7, 12.
73. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993); see also MARY
ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 205 (1985) (“Some
treatise writers have characterized settled case law as custom, but it is not
officially recognized as such.”); WATKIN, supra note 17, at 8–9 (“[T]he recorded
decisions of the courts in civil law countries . . . have considerable persuasive
force . . . . The decisions of the courts are referred to as their jurisprudence, and
this is regarded as a secondary source of law. . . . Court decisions however never
amount to a justifying reason why the law should be applied or interpreted in a
particular way.”).
74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (1986) (revised 1987).
75. Vernon Valentine Palmer & Harry Borowski, Louisiana, in MIXED
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 303 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2d ed. 2012).
76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3 (1986) (revised 1987).
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A. Civil Code Revision of 1987
The preliminary title of the Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 1987.
Article 1 now provides: “The sources of law are legislation and custom.” 77
The 1987 Revision Comments state that, “[a]ccording to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law.”78 The
comments further state that “legislation is the superior source of law in
Louisiana”;79 that “legislation is superior to any other source of law”;80
and that a judge “may look for solutions elsewhere” only when the case is
“not covered by legislation.”81
The definition of custom in article 3 was changed in 1987. It now
reads: “Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and generally
accepted as having acquired the force of law.”82 The comments state that
this definition “reproduces the substance” of the previous version and
“does not change the law.”83 The revision added the following to article 3:
“Custom may not abrogate legislation.”84 The comments reiterate that
“[l]egislation and custom are primary sources of law,” but “legislation is
the superior source of law in Louisiana.”85

77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2019).
78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (2019).
79. Id. cmt. a.
80. Id. cmt. c.
81. Id. Similarly, in Québec, legislation and custom are both considered
primary law, with custom being considered a “‘subsidiary’ primary source of
law.” F. Pearl Eliadis, The Legal System in Québec, in GERALD L. GALL, THE
CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 209, 219 (4th ed. 1995). The Civil Code of Québec
states, in pertinent part: “[T]he Code is the foundation of all other laws, although
other laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.” Civil Code of
Québec, S.Q. 1991, Preliminary Provisions (Can.).
82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.
83. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3 cmt. a.
84. Id.
85. Id. cmt. d.
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Although the comments to the Civil Code are not law,86 Louisiana
courts consider comments to be “highly authoritative.”87 The Louisiana
Supreme Court stated, “While the revision comments do not form part of
the law, they were presented together with the proposed legislation and
illuminate the understanding and intent of the legislators.”88
Notably, jurisprudence constante is not mentioned in either article 1
or 3, or in the comments to these articles, leaving the issue of whether
jurisprudence constante can be considered custom—and thus primary
law—open to interpretation.
B. Louisiana Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Code Revisions
After the 1987 revisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s first
pronouncement on the issue of jurisprudence constante was in Doerr v.
Mobil Oil Corp.89 Doerr contains several statements regarding the
authority to be given jurisprudence. The court first stated: “Judicial
decisions . . . are not intended to be an authoritative source of law in
Louisiana.”90 The court then quoted a law review article by Judge Dennis:
“Under the civilian tradition, . . . jurisprudence constante . . . operates with
‘considerable persuasive authority.’”91 The court concluded that “it is only
when courts consistently recognize a long-standing rule of law outside of
legislative expression that the rule of law will become part of Louisiana’s
86. H.R. Con. Res. 58, 1978 Leg., 4th Reg. Sess. (La. 1978); Louisiana Senate
Rules of Order, Joint Rule of Order of the Senate and House of Representatives No.
10, La. State Legislature, LA. ST. SENATE, http://senate.la.gov/Documents/
Rules/Joint.htm#10 [https://perma.cc/2JV5-RU3E] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). The
enacting legislation for the revisions to the Preliminary Title, including articles 1–
4, states that the “comments in this Act are not a part of the law and are not enacted
into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act.” 1987 La. Acts, § 3.
87. Melissa T. Lonegrass, Hidden Law: Taking the Comments More
Seriously, 92 TUL L. REV. 265, 296 (2017).
88. Wartelle v. Women’s & Children’s Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 783 (La.
1997). Professor Melissa Lonegrass described the comments to the Preliminary
Title of the Code, and specifically articles 1–4, as comments that “do much more
than simply contextualize the law. . . . [c]omments of this sort act as gap-fillers,
suggesting solutions to legal problems that did not make their way into the text
and making explicit various connections to which the text points only implicitly,
if at all.” Lonegrass, supra note 87, at 310.
89. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000).
90. Id. at 128.
91. Id. (citing Dennis, supra note 73, at 15). Dennis’s statement is supported
in the literature. See, e.g., WATKIN, supra note 17, at 8 (“[T]he recorded decisions
of the courts in civil law countries . . . have considerable persuasive force . . . .”).
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custom under Civil Code article 3 and be enforced as the law of the
state.”92
The court’s language regarding jurisprudence constante is confusing.
If the Louisiana Supreme Court meant jurisprudence constante when it
referred to “a long-standing rule outside of legislative expression,”93 the
court’s concluding statement conflicts with its statement that
jurisprudence constante has “considerable persuasive authority.”94 Law
that is primary and authoritative is binding; law that is secondary and
persuasive is not.95 Thus, jurisprudence constante cannot be both a “highly
persuasive” secondary source, and custom, a primary source that can “be
enforced as the law of the state.”
In the 2005 decision Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. Caddo
Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Commission,96 Justice Weimer adopted
Justice Dennis’s view that jurisprudence constante is a secondary,
nonbinding source of law, stating: “Jurisprudence constante carries
‘considerable persuasive authority,’ but is not the law.”97 He further stated:
“Jurisprudence constante, as this court recognized in Doerr, is only
‘persuasive authority.’”98 Again, in the 2015 case Kelly v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co.,99 Weimer stated that “legislation is a primary source of
law and jurisprudence constante is a secondary source of law.”100
Only one Louisiana intermediate appellate court has quoted Doerr’s
language regarding “a long-standing rule of law outside of legislative
expression” becoming custom, and thus authoritative law. Judge Amy of
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal used Doerr’s language in a
dissent in a way that seemed to refer to jurisprudence constante. The judge
found that the two recent cases the plaintiff cited were not “controlling,”
implying he was not bound to follow them because the cases did not form
a long-standing rule of law.101

92.
93.
94.
95.

Doerr, 774 So. 2d at 129.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 128 (citing Dennis, supra note 73, at 15).
See, e.g., ALGERO, supra note 7, at 6; CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL
METHOD AND WRITING 78–79 (2006); MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY HALLAM
DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 2–3 (2005).
96. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm’n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1087 (La. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
97. Id. at 1088 (internal citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1106 (Weimer, J., assigning additional reasons).
99. Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 169 So. 3d 328, 338 (La. 2015).
100. Id.
101. See Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 884 So. 2d 1257, 1262–63 (La.
Ct. App. 2004) (Amy, J., dissenting), rev’d, 908 So. 2d 1 (La. 2005).
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C. Legislative History of 1987 Revision
A review of legislative history reveals that Justice Weimer’s repeated
statements that jurisprudence constante is only a secondary source of law
are correct. When the legislature revised the Preliminary Title of the
Louisiana Civil Code in 1987 and reenacted articles 1 and 3, it intended
that jurisprudence, and even case law that rises to the level of
jurisprudence constante, be only secondary, persuasive, nonbinding law.
The Louisiana State Law Institute drafted the revisions.102 The
Preliminary Title Committee met on November 1, 1985;103 December 6,
1985;104 and February 6, 1987.105 The full Council met on February 14,
1986;106 February 27, 1987;107 and March 20, 1987.108 Before these
meetings, the reporter, Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, prepared background
materials for the other members, including excerpts from his book
Louisiana Civil Law System,109 and from the 1959 translation of Marcel
Planiol’s French treatise on the civil law.110 Both Yiannopoulos’s book
and Planiol’s treatise were used as textbooks in Louisiana and French law
schools, respectively. The materials the Law Institute provided for the first
two meetings included language regarding custom from Yiannopoulos’s
book: “[C]ivilian scholars in France have developed conflicting theories
as to the nature and effects of customs. . . . According to a third view,
customs derive exclusively from case law. This view must be rejected
because judges have no legislative authority.”111
Interestingly, the background materials did not include the section
from Yiannopoulos’s book that stated:
The theory that judicial precedents are not a source of law admits
an apparent exception. In Louisiana and in France, a long line of
102. The Louisiana State Law Institute was established by the Louisiana
Legislature in 1938 “to promote and encourage the clarification of the law of
Louisiana and its better adaptation to present social needs, to secure the better
administration of justice and to carry out scholarly research and scientific work.”
Act No. 166, 1938 La. Acts 429.
103. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm. (Nov. 1, 1985).
104. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm. (Dec. 6, 1985).
105. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm. (Feb. 6, 1987).
106. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council (Feb. 14, 1986).
107. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council (Feb. 27, 1987).
108. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council (Mar. 20, 1987).
109. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13.
110. PLANIOL, supra note 37.
111. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Materials for Meetings of Nov. 1, 1985 and Dec. 6,
1985 (quoting YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33).
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decisions on a certain subject may be taken to establish rules of
customary law. This is the doctrine of “settled jurisprudence”
(jurisprudence constante). Courts must follow this jurisprudence as
customary law rather than as merely precedents. In France, this
exception rests on doctrinal considerations; in Louisiana, there is
legislative foundation for it in Articles 3 and 21 of the Civil Code.112
In the December 1985 meeting, the Committee members discussed
whether jurisprudence could be a primary source of law. Two of the
members worried that the new language of article 1, stating that legislation
and custom were “[t]he sources of law,” “would mean that one could
interpret the article as allowing the use of doctrine and jurisprudence as
sources of law. They did not want this result.”113 Yiannopoulos “argued that
a tradition of Louisiana was that jurisprudence was not a source of law. He
explained that his comments explained that jurisprudence was a ‘secondary’
source of law and distinguishable from a ‘primary’ source of law.”114
The Committee then considered deleting articles 1–3, but Professor
Katherine Spaht “urged the Committee to retain the articles, since they
were used to emphasize that there was no judge-made law. She argued that
the legislature would oppose the absence of those articles.”115 In that
meeting, the Committee also amended the proposed language of article 3
“to clarify that custom resulted from a practice by the people and not by
the courts.”116
When the Council met to discuss the recommendations of the
committee,117 Yiannopoulos began by explaining that the language of
112. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 35, at 101 (emphasis added). Articles 3
and 21, referred to in the quotation, are the articles from the original version of
the Louisiana Civil Code in effect from 1808 to 1986, concerning custom and
usages. Article 3 provided: “Customs result from a long series of actions
constantly repeated, which have by such repetition and by uninterrupted
acquiescence acquired the force of a tacit and common consent.” LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3 (1986) (revised 1987). Article 21 provided: “In all civil matters, where there
is no express laws, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity.
To decide equitably an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received
usages, where positive law is silent.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1986), superseded
by LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2019).
113. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm., p. 2 (Dec. 6,
1985).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at p. 3.
117. For a description of the process followed by the Louisiana State Law
Institute, see Lonegrass, supra note 87, at 278–79.
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former article 1—“Law is a solemn expression of legislative will”—“was
part of Louisiana tradition and was used by our courts as authority for the
principle that judge-made-law was not law.”118 Some Council members
argued that under the Louisiana Constitution, only the legislature could
make laws.119 The Council temporarily adopted a motion indicating that
custom was a secondary source of law,120 but ultimately acceded to the
comment to article 1 that both legislation and custom were primary
sources. During all of the meetings, however, custom was referred to as
law created by the people, and the possibility that jurisprudence could rise
to the level of custom as jurisprudence constante was never discussed.
The language of articles 1 and 3 as drafted by the Law Institute was
submitted as House Bill number 1136.121 The bill was reported favorably
by the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 13, 1987,122
and was passed unanimously on May 15, 1987, as Act number 124, exactly
as drafted.123
IV. LOUISIANA COURTS’ TREATMENT OF CUSTOM
As noted at the outset, Louisiana cases applying custom are rare. Often
what the court calls custom is actually usage. Some attempts to use custom
are rejected for lack of proof; others are rejected because the asserted
custom is contrary to legislation or the contract between the parties. And
the facts that gave rise to the rare cases decided using custom in the last
century would probably not recur today.
A. Usage Cases
Despite the clear distinction between custom and usage in the Civil
Code, Louisiana courts tend to confuse and conflate the terms,124 probably
because of the lingering questions regarding what constitutes custom. 125

118. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council, p. 1 (Feb. 14, 1986).
119. Id. at p. 2.
120. Id.
121. H.B. 1136, 13th Sess. (La. 1987) (enacted).
122. H. REP. JOURNAL, 13th Sess. 472 (La. 1987).
123. Id. at 563.
124. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 94.
125. Lingering questions, such as the length of time required for a practice to
become a custom and the percentage of people who have to believe they are bound
for a practice to become “generally accepted as having acquired the force of law,”
as required by Louisiana Civil Code article 3, are beyond the scope of this Article.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 (2019).
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Thus, courts either refer to “custom or usage,” without attempting to
determine which actually applies in a particular case,126 or courts refer to
something as custom that can be only usage. For example, in the case
regarding payment for the wedding reception, the court noted the bride’s
testimony “that it is common custom for the parents of the bride to pay for
the wedding reception.”127 Instead of relying on custom as a primary
source of law, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing the bride from
the lawsuit by stating that “in the absence of express law, common custom
or received usages are examined in an appeal to equity.”128
Similarly, in the case of the ex-wife who wanted to continue to use her
former husband’s surname, the court stated that it could “look to
established custom and equity for assistance in deciding” the case.129 The
court noted Planiol’s writings that a woman had no right to use her
husband’s name after a divorce. The court also took judicial notice of “the
generally existent custom under which divorced women are known by a
combination of their Christian name, their family surname, and their
former husband's surname,”130 and recognized the right of a woman to
revert to her maiden name after divorce.131 The court concluded that in
“modern life,” divorce had “provoked the establishment of its own
customs,” including the “generally acknowledged acceptability of the use
of the husband’s surname by his former spouse.”132 Accordingly, a
divorced woman can use her maiden name or her husband’s surname.
Without a widespread sense that she is legally required to do one or the
other, however, only a usage has been shown, not a custom. Thus, although
the court stated it was using “established custom and equity” to decide the
case, the court actually applied a usage.

126. See, e.g., Hurst v. Ricard, 514 So. 2d 14, 16 (La. 1987) (“[I]t was a custom
or usage to divide chenal frontage into tapered tracts closing rearward.”); People’s
Bank & Trust Co. v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 119 So. 779, 780 (La. Ct. App.
1929) (“Such a custom or usage had the force of law between the parties . . . .”).
127. Int’l River Ctr. v. Kogos, 516 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
128. Id. (emphasis added). Under the Louisiana Civil Code, equity is the
application of “justice, reason, and prevailing usages” when no positive law
exists. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4. As no statute answered the question before the court,
the court decided the case by looking at what was usually done by people in
similar situations.
129. Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis
added).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Wilty v. Jefferson Par. Democratic Exec. Comm., 157 So. 2d
718 (La. 1963)); Succession of Kneipt, 134 So. 376 (La. 1931).
132. Welcker, 342 So. 2d at 254.
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B. Proof of Custom
French courts in the 18th century required proof of custom through
inquests, called turba, of at least ten local persons who were “thought
likely to know or remember” the customary law.133 Proof of the custom
required that ten people agree to the existence of the custom for it to be
binding.134 Later, the number increased to 20 as two turba were
required.135
Louisiana law did not adopt any specific requirements for proof of
custom. While the jurisprudence is unclear as to the burden of proof of
custom, courts tend to reject assertions of custom due to insufficient proof.
One of the first cases regarding proof of custom arose in 1834 in Broussard
v. Bernard, when an heir attempted to prove through parol evidence certain
customs regarding community property law and “that the Fuero Real of
the kingdom of Spain, was in force, where the succession was opened.”136
The court found that parol evidence could not prove custom, stating that
“[t]he recognition of customs, by our Code, necessarily admitted proof,
other than that required to establish laws.”137 The court, however,
remanded the case for the introduction of certain documentary evidence
that the trial judge originally rejected.138
Similarly, in 1841, the court rejected a claim by a ship’s captain that
he was entitled to a certain commission on freight according to “the usage
and custom of merchants in New Orleans.”139 The court held the evidence
of the custom was insufficient, stating that “when a custom is relied on, it
must be established by evidence, the private knowledge of the jury will
not authorize a verdict without the proof . . . and custom cannot be
regarded as law until a long and uninterrupted prevalence is proved.”140
In 1917, an attorney—who had given up his legal practice in favor of
real-estate investing—attempted to avoid paying a fee to another attorney
who had worked on his case for six years, citing the “custom of courtesy,”
i.e., members of one profession did not charge others in the same
profession.141 A dozen practitioners and judges were called to testify, and
the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove a binding legal
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

WATKIN, supra note 17, at 101.
Id.
Id.
Broussard v. Bernard, 7 La. 211, 215 (1834).
Id.
Id. at 215–16.
Tyson v. Laidlaw, 18 La. 380, 381 (1841).
Id. at 382 (citations omitted).
Thigpen & Herold v. Slattery, 73 So. 780, 782 (La. 1917).
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custom; most of the witnesses followed the rule, but the witnesses believed
the rule could be disregarded under the right circumstances.142 The court
added, however, that “a case might, perhaps, be presented in which that
rule would be applied as the law which should govern it.”143
In a recent case involving a dispute between two municipalities and
the parish police jury over who was responsible for paying the preadjudicative expenses for housing juveniles the municipalities arrested,
the court relied on Bernard.144 The towns claimed that the police jury had
paid the expenses in the past and that this “custom and practice” was
sufficient to obligate the police jury to pay in this situation as well.145
Without explaining what proof was necessary, the court rejected the
custom argument due to insufficient evidence, stating that the
jurisprudence regarding proof of custom has “remained unchallenged”
since Bernard.146
An odd example of proof of custom is found in the wedding reception
case. The plaintiff in that case—the reception hall—initially sued only the
bride and later added her parents as defendants.147 Despite provisions in
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure that allow a plaintiff to amend the
petition to add further defendants,148 the court stated that the plaintiff had
“tacitly acknowledged” the custom that the bride’s family pays for the
reception when it initially sued the bride and not the groom. The court
found the tacit acknowledgment was sufficient proof of this “common
custom.”149
One clear tenet regarding proof of custom is that the party seeking to
invoke a custom must prove that both parties were aware of the rule sought
to be declared custom.150 The decisions establishing this tenet are logical,
as the parties must be under the conviction that the rule has the force of
law—which is difficult to show when one party is unaware of the rule. If

142. Id. at 782–83.
143. Id. at 783.
144. City of Abbeville v. Vermilion Par. Police Jury, 85 So. 3d 233, 236–37
(La. Ct. App. 2012).
145. Id. at 236.
146. Id. at 237; id. (Painter, J., dissenting) (stating that the police jury’s
pleadings were insufficient to establish custom).
147. Int’l River Ctr. v. Kogos, 516 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
148. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1151 (2019).
149. Kogos, 516 So. 2d at 1329.
150. See, e.g., Lewis v. The Ship “Success,” 18 La. Ann. 1 (La. 1866) (quoting
Parrott v. Thacher, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 426, 438 (1830) (miscited by the court as
“Pratt v. Thatcher, 9 Peck”)); see also Hirsch v. N.H. Fire Ins. Co. of Manchester,
1 Teiss. 215, 219 (La. Ct. App. 1904).
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the parties are residents of the same area and one does not know of the
rule, the rule does not meet the “widespread observance” requirement.151
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “When . . . the question is of a
custom or usage, and it is not known to those who, from business and
connections, have the best means of knowing it, the ignorance of it is, in
some sense, positive testimony of its non-existence.”152
Furthermore, a rule that is widely known within an area cannot be
applied as customary law to a non-resident who is unaware of the rule.153
For example, in 1909, a theater company offered an actor an employment
contract “‘for the season’” but fired him after giving two weeks’ notice.154
The defendant testified that all employment contracts, “in theatrical
parlance, carry two weeks’ notice on either side.”155 The actor, however,
who was from Columbus, Ohio, testified he had never heard of the
custom.156 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to exclude evidence of the so-called custom, stating: “The usage
of a particular place or a particular class of persons cannot be binding on
non-residents or on any person, unless they are shown to have been
cognizant of it.”157
Requiring proof that both parties knew of the custom seems to conflict
with “the legal maxims that ‘all are presumed to know the law’ and that
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse,’”158 which are codified in Louisiana
Civil Code article 5.159 These maxims, which arise out of Roman civil
law,160 are “founded upon considerations of public policy and necessity
[and] should be adhered to in most instances.”161 The presumption that all
people know the law, however, is legally sound only when the law is
“certain and capable of being ascertained.”162 Although Roman law at the
time of the Digest was largely based on custom, it was “definite and
151. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
152. Lewis, 18 La. Ann. at 6.
153. See Hirsch, 1 Teiss. at 219.
154. Camp v. Baldwin-Mellville Co., 48 So. 927, 930 (La. 1909).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Hirsch, 1 Teiss. at 219.
158. Cruze v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 184 So. 735, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1938); see
also Gaspard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 So. 2d 839, 842 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 5 (2019) (“No one may avail himself of ignorance of
the law.”).
160. Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory
of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 350 (1998).
161. Cruze, 184 So. at 738–39.
162. Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV.
L. REV. 75, 76 n.1 (1908).
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knowable” because it was “well integrated with the community mores of
the time.”163 Modern statutory law is made definite and knowable through
enactment and publication of notice;164 after the promulgation of a law,
each person is charged with knowledge of the law.165 As custom is not
made public in this manner, the application of customary law to persons
who have no notice of the law does not comport with modern notions of
due process.166
C. Custom Cannot Abrogate Legislation
Even before the 1987 revision to article 3—explicitly stating that
custom cannot abrogate legislation—Louisiana courts adopted the
principle that custom could trump neither legislation nor the contract
between the parties.167 One of the earliest cases arose in 1832, when a
plaintiff demanded rescission of an entire sale of 401 coils of bale rope,
when only some of the rope was of unmerchantable quality.168 The law
was clear that he was entitled to return only the bad rope and not all of it.
Plaintiff asserted, however, that “a custom, or commercial usage in New
Orleans,” authorized return of the whole parcel if part of the order was
defective.169 The court held: “[W]here the law is express, no man or set of
men can create a custom for their own benefit or convenience, and give to
that custom a force paramount to that of the law.”170
The same principle was applied 150 years later when the defendants
asserted that a savings and loan’s (“the S&L”) practice of permitting sales
with assumption of the previous owner’s mortgage prevented the company
from enforcing the “due-on-sale” clause in the defendants’ mortgage.171
163. Davies, supra note 160, at 350 n.38.
164. See Fields v. State, 714 So. 2d 1244, 1259 (La. 1998).
165. Succession of Young, 732 So. 2d 833, 836 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
166. See Fields, 714 So. 2d at 1250. The Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires “that deprivation of life, liberty
or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr.
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The Court further held that although the rule that
“ignorance of the law is no excuse” is deeply ingrained in our law, the requirement
of notice under the Due Process Clause limits the exercise of that rule. Lambert
v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
167. See, e.g., Clement v. S. Atl. S.S. Line, 54 So. 920, 921 (La. 1911).
168. Ledoux v. Armour, 4 Rob. 381, 381–82 (La. 1832).
169. Id. at 385.
170. Id.
171. La. Sav. Ass’n v. Trahan, 415 So. 2d 592, 596 (La. Ct. App. 1982). A
due-on-sale clause is a contract provision in a mortgage that “authorizes a lender,
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The defendants’ home was financed by the S&L’s mortgage. 172 The
mortgage contained a due-on-sale clause that required the company’s
consent to a sale with assumption of mortgage, which would transfer the
obligations under the mortgage to any subsequent purchaser of the
home.173 When the defendants executed a sale with assumption without
the S&L’s consent, the S&L foreclosed.174
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the S&L’s prior
practice of permitting sales with assumption created a custom.175 The court
found there was both an express contractual provision and an express
Louisiana statute permitting the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.176
The court stated, “Jurisprudence construing Civil Code Article 3 has
established the rule that neither ‘custom’ nor ‘usage’ nor ‘practice’ may
prevent the enforcement of an express statutory provision.”177
D. True Custom Cases
It is necessary to go back to the early 20th century to find cases of true
custom. One such case, from 1927, involved the question of whether an
estate was responsible for the cost of the decedent’s headstone.178 The
decedent’s sister had ordered the grave marker, but she subsequently
opposed payment by the estate in the estate’s final accounting and
homologation.179 The court denied her opposition, citing Civil Code article
3 and stating: “The expenditure of a reasonable sum out of the estate of a
party who has died for the purpose of marking his grave is authorized by
a custom, so long existing that it has acquired the force and effect of a
law.”180
Another case in which the court applied custom with the force of law
arose in 1935. This case involved an overseer of a large cotton plantation

at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender’s security
instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein, securing the
real property loan is sold or transferred without the lender’s prior written consent.”
12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (2012).
172. Trahan, 415 So. 2d at 593.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 596.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App. 663, 664 (1927).
179. Id. at 666.
180. Id.
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who was fired in August despite being hired for “the year.”181 The court
stated that the rule that overseers were hired for the calendar year was so
well known that a court could take judicial notice of the custom “without
allegation or proof.”182
Today it is difficult to imagine a headstone being sold or a manager
being employed for a large agricultural holding without a written
agreement; for this reason, cases of this nature are unlikely to arise again.
V. MODERN DIMINISHMENT OF CUSTOM
Although most civil law systems today accept custom as a source of
law, the importance of custom has declined in modern legal systems.183 In
fact, John Henry Merryman commented in 1969 that the “amount of
writing on custom as law in civil law jurisdictions is immense, far out of
proportion to its actual importance as law. . . . [T]he importance of custom
as a source of law is slight and decreasing.”184 Custom fills the lacunae in
the statutes, but Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Mack Barham
commented in 1974 that the historical meaning of custom “is not
applicable in modern society as frequently as it was when our code was
adopted.”185
A 1962 law review article written by Albert Tate, Jr. is an indication
of the diminished status of customary law.186 Tate, a state appellate judge
who would go on to serve on the Louisiana Supreme Court, stated the
“principal formal sources used by a Louisiana judge” were the Civil Code
and the statutes, doctrine, and precedent.187 Tate’s only mention of custom
was in a footnote, wherein he stated he was omitting discussion of custom
because it was “used with relative infrequency in deciding civil litigation
in our state courts.”188

181. Fletcher v. Crichton, 164 So. 411, 412 (La. 1935).
182. Id. at 413.
183. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89.
184. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 24–25 (1969).
185. Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana,
in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED
JURISDICTIONS 38, 49 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974).
186. Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22
LA. L. REV. 727, 728 (1962).
187. Id. at 728.
188. Id. at 728 n.4; see also MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 131 (3d ed. 2008) (“In the civil law theory of
sources of law, custom is regularly listed as a primary source, but routinely
dismissed as of slight practical importance . . . .”).
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Custom has declined in importance for three primary reasons: (1) a
strong legislature; (2) a more diverse population; and (3) our everchanging modern society.189 As Gény explained in 1899, “[A]s social
relations become more complex, as ethnical groups fuse, and as the
national aspirations are changed under the influence of cosmopolitism
which makes a strong political centralization necessary, the force of
customary law recedes in the face of the constantly growing role of written
legislation.”190 Yiannopoulos stated that customary law flourishes when
there is “no central power sufficiently strong to make new laws and to
enforce obedience to the old,” but declines “[d]uring periods of strength
and of good organization.” According to Yiannopoulos, this explains
custom’s decline in importance.191 Louisiana currently has a strong
legislature with power to make new laws and enforce old ones, and thus
application of customary law is unnecessary.
Customary law is strongest as a source of law in “small and closely
knit communities, which often do not share the modern needs for fixed
laws.”192 Louisiana now has almost 4.7 million people193 of many races,194
ethnicities, cultures,195 and religions.196 It is difficult to imagine an
uncodified practice that all, or even most, Louisiana citizens believe to be
a binding legal obligation. The “custom” Yiannopoulos gave as an
example during the Law Institute meetings—a wife taking her husband’s

189. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89.
190. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 111.
191. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89; see also PLANIOL, supra note
37, § 3(13) 11.
192. Kadens & Young, supra note 29, at 899.
193. Louisiana’s population in 2016 was 4,682,000. PROQUEST STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2018 23 (6th ed. 2018).
194. In 2016 Louisiana was 61.2% white, 4.3% Hispanic, 31.2% black, 0.6%
American Indian, 1.6% Asian, and 1.1% other. ANGIE SWANSON, LOUISIANA 16
(Jaclyn Jaycox ed., 2017).
195. “The rich diversities in the land, people, and culture of Louisiana are
matters of common knowledge. They have been celebrated in song and story.
Many of these are deeply rooted in history.” Nomey v. State, 315 So. 2d 709, 716
(La. 1975) (Sanders, C.J., dissenting); see also SWANSON, supra note 194
(“Louisiana is a land of many cultures. French, British, Spanish, Haitian, and
African ancestors created a special culture in Louisiana.”); Erin Ashley
Hammons, I Spy Something Useful: The Short Life and Senseless Death of
Louisiana Senate Bill 250, 43 S.U. L. REV. 355, 355 (2016) (“Louisiana [is] one
of the most . . . culture-rich states in the nation.”).
196. See PROQUEST STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2018,
supra note 193, at 59.
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name upon marriage—was not considered a binding legal obligation in
1987 by most people and is certainly not considered binding today.197
Sixty years ago, in 1958, Dean Loussouarn noted that custom forms
too slowly to keep up with the fast evolution of modern society.198
Yiannopoulos echoed this notion in 1974, stating that “the formation of
customs is too slow to cope with the growing demands of a developing
society.”199 With the advent of computers and the internet, the world
moves even faster today. The likelihood of an uncodified practice being
followed for a “long time” with the belief that it is legally binding seems
exceedingly slim in today’s world.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana is now too diverse and populous for any uncodified practice
to be both repeated for a long period of time and generally accepted as
bearing a legal obligation. The only remaining source of law Louisiana
courts might consider to be custom is jurisprudence constante, a doctrine
the legislature never intended to be a primary source of law.200
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent statements that
jurisprudence, even when it becomes jurisprudence constante, is only a
197. The suffragist Lucy Stone kept her maiden name when she married in
1855, and in the 1920s, “prominent feminists formed the Lucy Stone League to
help married women preserve the identity of their own surnames.” Claudia Goldin
& Maria Shim, Making a Name: Women’s Surnames at Marriage and Beyond, 18
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 143, 143 (2004). In 2004, a study showed that almost 20%
of college-educated women retained their maiden names upon marriage. Id. at
159. Another study showed that 14% of women kept their maiden names in the
1980s and that 22% do so in the current decade. Claire Caine Miller & Derek
Willis, Maiden Names, on the Rise Again, N.Y. TIMES ST1 (June 28, 2015).
198. Loussouarn, supra note 51, at 255.
199. Yiannopoulos, supra note 32, at 71.
200. This statement excludes Louisiana Indian tribal courts, which are outside
the scope of this Article. Custom remains an important consideration for those
courts. For example, the Coushatta tribe specifically lists “[c]ustoms, traditions
and culture of the Coushatta Tribe” as a source of law. 1 COUSHATTA TRIBE OF
LA. JUDICIAL CODE § 1.2.08(4) (2004). The Chitimacha Code of Judicial Conduct
states: “The Code is to be applied consistently with applicable constitutional
requirements, tribal laws, rules of court, decisional law, tribal tradition and
custom, common sense and in the context of all relevant circumstances.” I
CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 402 (1990). It further provides:
“A judge shall rely only on those procedures which are prescribed by, or are
consistent with, the laws, rules, traditions or customs of the Chitimacha Tribe of
Louisiana.” Canons of Judicial Conduct, R. 3.1(5).

1070

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

persuasive source of law, some courts feel obligated to abide by the
decisions of higher courts. Some judges have stated that the lower courts
are “bound”201 or “constrained”202 to follow the higher courts.
Lower courts tend to follow the decisions of higher courts for several
reasons: (1) out of “a systemic respect for jurisprudence,” according to
Professor Mary G. Algero of Loyola New Orleans;203 (2) because they do
not want to be reversed or are persuaded by the higher court’s reasoning,204
according to Merryman;205 or (3) because “they may lose prestige if they
are seen to be inconstant” and desire “additional prestige . . . if they make
stable law by always adhering to their decisions.”206 But courts in a civilian
or mixed jurisdiction such as Louisiana should not feel obligated to follow
jurisprudence simply because of a misinterpretation of outdated language
in the Civil Code regarding custom. The time has come for the legislature
to end the confusion by amending Civil Code articles 1 and 3 as well as
the comments associated with those articles to remove custom as a primary
source of law.

201. See, e.g., Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39, 44 (La. 2012) (“[T]rial
courts and courts of appeal are bound to follow the last expression of law of the
Louisiana Supreme Court.”); Gauthreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 588 So. 2d 723,
725 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“[A]s an intermediate appellate court we are bound to
follow the precedent set by our Supreme Court.”).
202. See, e.g., Nugent v. McNease, 195 So. 3d 533, 535 (La. Ct. App. 2016);
Howard v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 180 So. 3d 384, 400 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
203. Mary Garvey Algero, Considering Precedent in Louisiana: Balancing the
Value of Predictable and Certain Interpretations with the Tradition of Flexibility
and Adaptability, 58 LOY L. REV. 113, 115 (2012).
204. One intermediate appellate court stated: “Pretermitting all speculations as
to whether the court is technically bound to follow” the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decision, it “recognize[d] the fact that it expresse[d] the deliberate, and
presumably well considered, views of the Supreme Court on the subject.” Thus,
it accepted them as “advisory.” Estalotte v. Clements, 8 Teiss. 227, 230 (La. Ct.
App. 1911).
205. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 47 (3d ed. 2007). Additional reasons posited by Merryman are that the
lower courts are impressed by the higher courts or that “they are too lazy to think
the problem through themselves.” Id.
206. LAWSON, supra note 23, at 84.

